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Wolf Creek Dam was completed in 1952 as a 5,736-foot long and 258-foot high 
combination embankment-concrete gravity dam.  Its storage capacity of 6 million acre 
feet makes it the ninth largest reservoir in the nation. The dam was built on a heavily 
karstified limestone foundation and began exhibiting signs of excess foundation seepage 
in late 1967. This led to extensive corrective work in the 1970s beneath the earthen core 
of the embankment to reduce underseepage. In 2006 an independent assessment by the 
Dam Safety Action Classification (DSAC) Peer Review Panel recommended that Wolf 
Creek Dam exhibited “Urgent and Compelling” foundation seepage issues that required 
immediate attention.  This classification triggered the most complex dam foundation 
remediation project of any dam in the world, with an estimated total cost of $594 million, 
requiring years of construction (2007- 2013). The drilling and grouting techniques being 
applied insitu beneath the embankment section will likely establish new standards of 
practice for remediation and foundation beneficiation for hydraulic structures built on 
karst sites, such as embedded barrier walls. These past and present remediation efforts are 
addressed and analyzed in this study to create a fully comprehensive review of the 
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1.1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Throughout its service life Wolf Creek Dam has been plagued by intermittent 
problems with foundation seepage. Consequently, numerous documents have been 
prepared detailing various aspects of the problems and subsequent attempts at 
remediation. The unique and complex nature of the damsite has limited efforts to compile 
a comprehensive analysis of the project. One of the most thorough reports of Wolf Creek 
Dam was completed in 2005 by the US Army Corps of Engineers, Nashville District in 
their “Major Rehabilitation Evaluation Report.” However, this report only provides the 
information collected up to the decision to embark on the current remediation effort. The 
purpose of the following study was to prepare a “lessons learned” analysis of the Wolf 
Creek Dam project from its original construction in 1941-1952 to installation of the 
barrier wall completed in 2013. This has been accomplished by means of an extensive 
literature review, communication with the project staff, and site visits to the Wolf Creek 
Dam Safety Rehabilitation Project of 2008-2013. 
Through this case study a more complete picture of the scientific and 
technological advancements in foundation remediation for dams built on karst 
foundations is presented. Emphasis will also be given to the notable differences between 
the first diaphragm wall installed at the dam in the late 1970s and the new barrier wall. 
Wolf Creek Dam effectively served as a testing ground for embedded seepage barriers, 
and advances in the state of practice for seepage barriers for future generations. 
 
1.2. SITE DESCRIPTION 
Wolf Creek Dam is located in Russell County of south-central Kentucky. The 
nearest town is Jamestown, roughly 10 miles northeast of the damsite. The dam itself was 
constructed within the Ohio River Basin along the Cumberland River, 460.9 miles from 
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its confluence with the Ohio River (Simmons 1982). Figure 1.1 below shows the location 
of the damsite relative to the Cumberland River and the Kentucky-Tennessee boarder. 
 
 




The dam is just over a mile in length, extending 5,736-feet. It is a composite 
structure comprised of a 1,796-foot long concrete gravity section, and a 3,940- foot long 
rolled-fill earth embankment section (Bradley, et al. 2007).  The top of the dam is 773 
feet above mean sea level, and is crossed by US Highway 127. An aerial image of Wolf 
Creek Dam is shown in Figure 1.2. The transition from embankment to concrete section 
is clearly visible, as well as the tailwater exiting the powerhouse. Note that the photo was 
taken during the recent remediation, which can be seen by the work platform along the 




Figure 1.2.  Aerial view of Wolf Creek Dam (Google 2012) 
 
 
1.3. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS 
Wolf Creek Dam has experienced seepage problems since its initial impoundment 
in 1951. However, the seepage didn’t merit significant attention until the late 1960s, 
when wet areas and sinkholes began developing along the downstream toe of the 
embankment section. The concentrated seepage was ascribed to the karstified limestone 
foundation and high hydraulic head. A barrier wall was installed through the 
embankment section in the 1970s. In the 25 years following this work increasing seepage 
was noted with the passage of each year, suggesting a worsening situation. In a final 
attempt to mitigate the excess seepage an extensive and complex remediation and 




2. INITIAL CONSTRUCTION 
 
2.1. DECISION TO BUILD 
 In December 1926 - January 1927 the largest recorded flood occurred along the 
Cumberland River (Johnson 1978). This brought public attention to the need for flood 
control along the Cumberland River. In 1936, Congress acknowledged that “a policy for 
nationwide participation by the Federal government in the control of floods and reduction 
of flood damages” should be established (Johnson 1978). The Flood Control Act of 1938 
allowed local agencies to partner with the Corps of Engineers to carry out flood control 
and other projects, such as those on the Cumberland River. 
The Corps of Engineers selected six tributary reservoir sites that could be utilized 
to maintain flood control in the Ohio River Basin (Johnson 1978). Only four of these sites 
were eventually realized; Wolf Creek, Dale Hollow, Center Hill, and J. Percy Priest dams 
(USACE 2005). Wolf Creek Dam was to be the first built, primarily for flood control, but 
equipped with hydroelectric power generation (Johnson 1978). The Corps began 
preparing plans in 1938, and a ground breaking ceremony was held on September 1
st
 
1941 (Johnson 1978).  
 
2.2. IMPACTS OF WAR 
In early December 1941 the USA declared war on Japan and Germany declared 
war on the US. Material shortages caused by the war shut down Wolf Creek Dam. 
Initially the production schedule was adjusted to hasten a completion by 1944, to provide 
additional hydroelectric power for the Southeastern war industries (Johnson 1978). 
Unfortunately the necessary materials, equipment, and workers were needed for the war 
effort. Construction was postponed in August 1943, at which time the dam was 






2.3. FINAL COMPLETION 
About a year after the war ended in 1945 construction of the dam resumed in 
September of 1946 (USACE 1964). Figure 2.1 shows a historical image of the masonry 
portion of the dam under construction in 1947. Final closure of the dam was 
accomplished in December, 1950 (USACE 1964). This was followed by full 
impoundment to the spillway crest in March, 1951 (USACE 1964). Wolf Creek Dam was 
declared completed in August 1952 when the last of the powerhouse turbines was placed 




Figure 2.1.  Wolf Creek Dam under construction in 1947 (from Johnson 1992)  
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3. STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS 
 
3.1. CONCRETE MASONRY SECTION 
The masonry portion of the dam is comprised of 37 concrete gravity monoliths 
that sit on the original river channel, while the embankment section extends along the 
right abutment (USACE 2005). It has a maximum height of 258 feet from the base to the 
crest. At each end of the masonry section are two higher non-overflow sections. The 
masonry section supports an overflow spillway and six 4 x 6 foot low level sluice gates 
(Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). The spillway sill is situated at elevation 723, 
capped by ten tainter (radial) gates, each measuring 50 x 37 feet (USACE 1964). The 
powerhouse is fed by six 20-foot diameter penstocks connecting to the six turbines 
(USACE 1964). Each turbine has a design capacity of 45,000 kW, for a total generating 
capacity of 270,000 kW (USACE 2005).  Interestingly, when the project began “the 
ultimate power-generating capacity was equal to all the power [then] produced in the 
remainder of the commonwealth of Kentucky” (Johnson 1978).  
Solution features were observed in the bedrock beneath the right six monoliths, 
and caves were exposed beneath Monoliths 31 and 37 (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 
2008). The area beneath Monolith 37 exhibited the most extensive solution development, 
and lay beneath the transition between the earth embankment and concrete, commonly 
referred to as the “wraparound” area. This interface between earthen and concrete 
elements was three-dimensionally complex, and was probably the least desirable area for 
poor foundation conditions. The designers assumed that reservoir pore pressures would 
be reduced with flowage through the earth embankment, while the full reservoir head 
would be acting on the upstream heel of the concrete monoliths. 
Two of the most prominent solution features beneath the masonry section were 
treated by widening them through blasting, followed by a clamshell excavation of the 
infill materials, with a concrete backfill (USACE 2005). A single line grout curtain was 
installed under the masonry section to intercept solution features (Spencer, Greene and 
Haskins 2006). It is believed by the Corps of Engineers (2005) that some of these 
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solution features were not adequately sealed due to the lack of a complete exploration 
program beneath the concrete Monoliths at the time of original construction. 
 
3.2. EMBANKMENT SECTION 
3.2.1. Main Design Elements.  The embankment is composed of more than 
10,000,000 cubic yards (Simmons 1982) of well-compacted, low plasticity clay taken 
from the local valley alluvium (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). It extends from 
concrete Monolith 37 at embankment station 35+11L, to station 74+51L across the flood 
plain to the right abutment (USACE 1988). Although it is longer than the masonry 
section, the embankment has a maximum structural height of 215 feet (Bradley, et al. 
2007). The side slopes range from an angle of 1V on 2H, to 1V on 3½H (Simmons 1982). 
The downstream slope has three 10-foot wide, 1-foot tall maintenance drainage berms, 
and the upstream slope has one maintenance berm (USACE 2005). Figure 3.1 shows the 
general plan of the dam. 
 
Figure 3.1. Plan of Wolf Creek Dam (modified from Rice and Duncan 2007) 
8 
 
The construction specifications for the embankment called for complete removal 
of overburden materials to the “top of rock” in those areas adjacent to the concrete 
Monolith and along the cutoff trench (USACE 1988).  The majority of the embankment 
is underlain by 40 to 50 feet of stratified alluvial materials lying over the bedrock 
(Roemhildt 2007). In descending order there is an average 20 foot thickness of low 
permeability alluvial overburden; lying upon another 20 foot thickness of more pervious 
overburden; underlain by a thin layer of silty sand, sands, and gravels (USACE 1988). 
The result being that the low permeabilty alluvial material became part of the functioning 
embankment.  
In an attempt to remove the water that would inevitably be pressed out during the 
embankment loading, a 2 foot thick drainage blanket was placed over the low 
permeability alluvium, comprised of sand and gravel, between stations 40+00L to 
60+00L (USACE 1988). Flow from the drainage blanket through the dam’s three V-
notched weirs has recorded little to no flow (USACE 2005). The blanket did not serve its 
purpose as an effective drain. 
3.2.2. Cutoff Trench.  The purpose of the cutoff trench was to enable inspection 
of the overburden and bedrock, permit grouting below the trench floor, and “to seal off 
the solution channels, cavities, and overburden, and thereby prevent excessive leakage of 
the reservoir water through the foundation” (USACE 2005).  The trench lies beneath the 
entire embankment (from Monolith 37 to embankment station 72+49.20L) (USACE 
2005). The cutoff trench runs along the upstream toe of the dam, generally parallel to the 
centerline. It terminates at the masonry section by curving into Monolith 37, see Figure 
3.2. By current standards, the trench is considered steep and narrow; with side slopes of 
1V on 1-1/2 H, and a 10-foot wide floor (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). The side 
wall inclination varied significantly throughout its length, from gentle to vertical 
(USACE 2005). A single line grout curtain was installed along the centerline of the cutoff 
trench (USACE 2005). The lines were on 10-foot centers, angled landward on a 12 
degree slope, and extended to a depth 50 feet below the top of rock (USACE 2005). Due 
to the interconnectedness of the solution features throughout the foundation, several holes 
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experienced abnormal grout takes. In the end 20,387 bags of cement were needed for the 
grout curtain below the cutoff trench (USACE 2005). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Plan of the as-constructed cutoff trench relative to the main features of the 
damsite (modifed from Fetzer 1979). 
(1) Top of the cutoff trench excavation, (2) Bottom of cutoff trench, (3) Drainage blanket, 
(4) Relief drains, (5) Toe of embankment, (6) Toe of berm 
 
It is important to note that an extensive solution feature was uncovered at cutoff 
station 22+29 during the excavation. It was later utilized as part of the trench (shown in 
Figure 3.3), since it existed in approximately the same location as the original design, 
which was parallel to the dam axis (USACE 2005). To be expected, the trench 
intercepted many other solution features, including large caves, that branched off at 
nearly right angles (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). These features coincided with 
the two major joint sets at the site (USACE 2005). The solution features ranged from less 
than inch to more than 40-feet wide (USACE 2005), and were found in various degrees 
of infill of a pervious stratified clayey silt (USACE 1988).  
Although the use of the solution channel as part of the trench is an obvious 
mistake by current standards, in the 1940s it was considered convenient. There was a lack 
of understanding that water flowage through joints and solution features for millions of 
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years develops preferential flow paths. It should never have been considered the best 
place to construct the dam’s primary line of defense against seepage. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Historical photograph of the core trench excavation. Note the attached 
comments on the unfavorable geologic conditions. (from USACE 2005) 
 
The solution riddled trench exposed numerous overhangs and jagged walls that 
were not smoothed down. This oversight precluded development of a tight connection 
between the impervious fill and jagged walls of the old sinkholes. Zoccola, Haskins and 
Jackson (2008) point out a key proclamation incorporated in an original design photo, 
which states “Overhangs and loose rock will be removed only where they cross the line 
of the trench, since the earthfill in the sides of the trench will have the function only of 
stability and not of an absolutely uniform tight contact with the trench walls.” This 
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statement emphasizes designer’s lack of understanding that even a small space between 
the trench walls and clay fill could serve as a seepage flow path. Those larger solution 
channels that crossed the centerline of the trench were cleared out and covered with a 
concrete plug (USACE 2005). However, many of the caves were never excavated 
completely to bedrock (USACE 2005). Their entrances were blocked with sandbags and 
backfilled with soil (Spencer, Greene and Haskins 2006). Compaction of the fill was, 
therefore, wholly inadequate. The trench was backfilled with grading equipment where 
accessible, but had to be hand-tamped along much of the rough walls (Zoccola, Haskins 
and Jackson 2008). Some of these practices are illustrated in Figure 3.4 below. Overall 
the cutoff trench is considered one of the key design flaws of Wolf Creek Dam, and has 
likely promoted through seepage and piping of the dam since its construction. 
 
 
Figure 3.4.  Historical photograph of the cutoff trench during fill placement  





 The masonry and embankment sections collectively serve to retain Wolf Creek 
Dam reservoir, known as Lake Cumberland. At maximum impoundment the reservoir 
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extends 101.3 miles up the Cumberland River to the foot of Cumberland Falls, and 
encompasses 1,235 miles of shoreline (USACE 2005). The average impoundment at 
normal stage is 4,000,000 acre-feet of water. The average pool level exhibits a 30 foot 
seasonal fluctuation between elevation 692 to 722 (Simmons 1982). However, at flood 
stage the pool elevation can reach 760 feet, with a maximum storage capacity of 
6,089,000 acre-feet of water (Kellberg and Simmons 1977). The minimum pool level for 
power generation is at elevation 673; yielding an average net head of 170 feet (USACE 
1988). 
Upon completion in 1952 the reservoir was the fifth largest in the United States 
(Johnson 1978). Currently, Lake Cumberland is the ninth largest reservoir in the US, but 
still the largest east of the Mississippi River (Bradley, et al. 2007). Since the initial 
impoundment in 1951 its purposes have grown to include: a local source of flood control, 
hydropower, water supply, water quality, and recreation (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 
2008). The significance of these is described in Table 3.1. Lake Cumberland has 
approximately 5 million visitors per year, exceeding that of Yellowstone Nation Park or 
the Grand Canyon, and is thus, forms a vital part of the local economy (US Army Corps 
of Engineers, Nashville District 2007). 
 
Table 3.1.  Major contributions of Lake Cumberland and Wolf Creek Dam. 
Statistics acquired from (Lopez and Haskins 2011) and (Bruce 2013) 
Use Significance 
Flood Control 
Average of $34 million in annual flood damages prevented, and 
approximately 40% of the total flood storage for the Cumberland 
Basin 
Hydropower Generates approximately $77 million dollars annually 
Water Supply 
Municipal water suppliers serve an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 
users 
Recreation 
Generates approximately $159 million annually for the local 
economy 
Water Quality 
Supplies cool, oxygenated water to the entire Cumberland River 
System 
Other 





3.4. WOLF CREEK DAMSITE 
In summary, the Wolf Creek damsite supports a concrete gravity dam connected 
to an earthen embankment dam. The impounded reservoir also feeds the hydroelectric 
power house attached to the masonry dam. A cutoff, or “core trench,” is located under the 
embankment on the upstream side to inhibit underseepage. A profile view of these key 
elements and their elevations is illustrated in Figure 3.5 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.  Typical cross section of Wolf Creek Dam (from Santillan and Salas 2012)  
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4. GEOLOGIC SETTING 
 
4.1. GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS 
Wolf Creek Dam and Lake Cumberland are located within the Upper Cumberland 
Basin, between the Highland Rim and the Cumberland Plateau, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
The dam lies within the Highland Rim, a lower plateau of Ordovician to Mississippian 
age (USACE 2005). The bed of the Cumberland River is situated approximately 500 feet 
below the Highland Rim, and about 550 feet above sea level. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Damsite location with respect to the Highland Rim and other major 
geomorphic provinces of the region (from Kellberg and Simmons 1977) 
 
 
The foundation of Wolf Creek Dam is composed of approximately 70% limestone 
and 30% shale units (Lopez and Haskins 2011). In ascending order the stratigraphic units 
that comprise the Highland Rim are the: Ordovician age Catheys, Leipers, and 
Cumberland limestone; Devonian age Chattanooga shale; and Mississippian age Fort 
Payne marine limestone (Kellberg and Simmons 1977). There is an unconformity 
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between the Catheys and Leipers formations in which the Catheys was likely exposed 
(USACE 2005). These formations are shown in the stratigraphic columns presented in 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Stratigraphy of the Wolf Creek Dam foundation. 
(modified from Kellberg and Simmons 1977, and Simmons 1982) 
 
 
Sometime during the late Pliocene or early Pleistocene a period of uplift and 
erosion occurred (USACE 2005). It is during this time that the karst features are believed 
to have developed (USACE 2005). The Leipers formation and upper five feet of the 
Catheys formation are carved with solution features that impact the Wolf Creek Dam 
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foundation (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). These two formations are very similiar. 
They are both argillaceous limestones with thin interbeds of calcareous shales (USACE 
1988). Combined they make up a total of 230 feet of limestone at the base of the dam 
(USACE 1988). “The Catheys formation is a hard, thin-to-massive and even-bedded, 
dark gray, argillaceous limestone, interbedded with thin, well-cemented, calcareous 
shales” (Fetzer 1979). The Leipers formation is generally “…thinner-bedded, more 
argillaceous, and more fossiliferous” than the Catheys (Fetzer 1979). Capping these two 
is the Cumberland formation, which is described by Fetzer (1979) as “…a dense, 
greenish-gray, massive, nonfossiliferous, arnenaceous to argillaceous, dolomitic 
limestone” of varying thickness. Another unconformity exists between the Cumberland 
and Chattanooga formations (USACE 2005). The latter of which is chiefly a “…fairly 
hard, well cemented, fissile, black, carbonaceous silt shale…” (USACE 2005). The Fort 
Payne Formation, seen at the height of each abutment, is a combination “…of 
argillaceous limestones, calcareous shale, and some thin beds of cherty limestone.” 
(USACE 2005).  
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Geologic section of Wolf Creek Dam (from Kellberg and Simmons 1977) 
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4.2. SITE STRUCTURAL GEOLOGY 
The dam is located on the eastern side of the northeast-southwest trending 
Cincinnati Arch (USACE 2005). Thus, the relatively flat-lying units have a gradual dip 
upstream of roughly 30 feet per mile (USACE 1988).  Overall the bedrock is structurally 
intact, without any faulting at the site (USACE 2005). However, there exists regional 
jointing that trends both parallel and perpendicular to the dam axis (USACE 1988). The 
systematic regional joint set that is normal to the dam axis is oriented approximately N 
30W, and is known to be highly karstified (USACE 2005).  This fact is all the worse for 
its significant position under Monolith 37 and the concrete-embankment interface. A 
conjugate set of regional joints are oriented approximately N 75E (see Figure 4.4). This 
was the set utilized for the cutoff trench described previously. All other minor localized 
jointing within the bedrock was thought to be caused by slight variations of dip direction 
and bed inclination as reported by the US Army Corps of Engineers (1988). The intensely 
solutioned Leipers formation exhibits channels and caves developed along the near 
vertical joints and horizontal bedding planes (Fetzer 1979). The bedding thickness ranges 
from 3 to 48 -inches in the limestone formations, and from “paper thin” to 12-inches in 
the shale formations (Lopez and Haskins 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4.4.  Joint rosette typical of the Wolf Creek damsite. Note the sets which run 
parallel (red) and perpendicular (green) to the dam axis have been indicated with arrows. 





4.3. KARST PROCESSES 
The seepage of the Wolf Creek Dam foundation is in large part due to solution of 
the carbonate rocks lying beneath the embankment section. The term karst refers to “a 
terrain, generally underlain by limestone, in which the topography is chiefly formed by 
the dissolving of rock, and which is commonly characterized by karren, closed 
depressions, subterranean drainage, and caves” (Monroe 1970). Limestone is the most 
widespread karst rock (Jennings 1971), and is therefore often used synonymously for all 
carbonate rocks. However, other soluble rocks include: limestone varieties (CaCO3), 
dolomite CaMg(CO3)2,  anhydrite (CaSO4), gypsum(CaSO4 * 2H2O), and halite (NaCl). 
In the case of Wolf Creek Dam, it is mainly the Catheys and Leipers limestone 
formations that exhibit gross solution features. Solutioning may occur through reactions 
with different acids, but most commonly by carbonic acid (Jennings 1971). The general 
reaction series, as described by Jennings (1971), is given below: 
 
1. Dissolved calcium carbonate in an ionic state. 
CaCO3 (solid)    Ca
2+ 
(hydrated)  +  CO  
   (hydrated)   (1) 
 
2. Dissolved carbon dioxide reacts with water to produce carbonic acid in an ionic 
state. 
CO2 (dissolved)  +  H2O    H
+
   +  HCO  
     (2) 
 
3. Carbonate ions from the dissolved limestone react with the hydrogen ions to 
produce bicarbonate ions. 
CO  
    +  H
+
    HCO  
       (3) 
 
4. The overall net reaction for the dissolution of calcium carbonate is: 
CaCO3  +  CO2  +  H2O    Ca
2+
  +  2HCO  




The dissolution of soluble rock occurs at a rate of approximately one inch per 
1000 years (Technos, Inc. 2005). However, there are many contributing factors that may 
affect this rate. Of greatest importance are the temperature and partial pressure of carbon 
dioxide.  The significance of these variables is illustrated in Henry’s Law as applied to 
carbonate solution:  
The total amount of limestone which can be dissolved at saturation 
equilibrium per unit volume of water is overall a direct function of the 
carbon dioxide partial pressure of the air with which the water is in contact 
and an inverse function of the water temperature because of the latter’s 
control of the dissolved CO2 saturation equilibrium (Jennings 1971). 
Permeability is another major factor in determining the amount of limestone 
solution. Often karst development is more dependent on secondary permeability, rather 
than the intergranular permeability of the bedrock (Jennings 1971). The bedding planes 
and fractures within the limestone expose a greater surface area for solution to take place. 
Over time these planes of weakness are enlarged forming underground conduits, caves, 
and karst surface expressions. This is why the solution features within the Catheys and 
Leipers Formations have developed in a pattern similar to that of the local and regional 
joint trends (USACE 1988).  
 
4.4. PIPING DEVELOPMENT 
 The solution activity of the limestone foundation has created natural flow paths 
for reservoir seepage under, around, and through the core trench. These conduits appear 
to have been enlarged by the erosional process of piping. The term piping, as given by 
Parker (1964), refers to “…the development of internal drainage tubes in silty soils or 
weakly consolidated siltstone, claystone, or similar bedrock.” The condition is most 
common in arid and semiarid regions, as well as site-specific locations of large hydraulic 
head differentials (Parker 1964). Wolf Creek Dam is a prime example of the latter, in 
which the construction of the dam created a reservoir head that ranges from 175 to 200 
feet (Spencer, Greene and Haskins 2006). In this situation water pushes through the dam 
along solution features and structural weaknesses, eroding material out as it progresses. 
This process is enhanced by the rapid 20 foot flux of tail water during power generation, 
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which is thought to cause headward erosion and pressure surging of the solution features 
(USACE 1988). This type of erosional processes’ effect on hydraulic structures is 
depicted in Figure 4.5 below. The internal erosion within the dam weakens the support of 
the overlying materials, which may cause subsidence or even collapse above. The more 
time that passes the more detrimental the effects of piping can be due to its cyclic nature. 
In this cycle water erodes and enlarges the “pipes,” or conduits, which causes an increase 
in the volume of water that can flow through it, which then increases the overall erosive 




Figure 4.5.  Four-phased models for the development of piping failure  
(from Rice and Duncan 2007)  
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5. PERFORMANCE OF THE DAM 
 
5.1. DISTRESS SIGNS 
 Wolf Creek Dam was originally built without any monitoring instrumentation on 
or around the damsite (Roemhildt 2007). Thus, any indication that the dam was not 
operating properly was established solely through visual observation. Such observations 
were noted in 1962 in the form of wet areas noted around the downstream toe of the 
embankment, approximately 2,000 feet from the tailrace (Simmons 1982). Up to this time 
the dam was assumed to be functioning normally for the eleven years since its initial 
impoundment. 
By 1967 these wet areas had grown in size, promoting the growth of tall grasses 
and cattails, which were too wet to mow (Villet 1978). In August of that year a sinkhole 
approximately 3 feet in diameter appeared near the wet areas (USACE 2005). In October 
1967 muddy water was noted in the power plant tailrace during a period of low flow due 
to lack of power generation (USACE 2005).  The muddy flow was later determined to be 
emanating from remnant subsurface drainage pipes left from previous construction 
(USACE 2005). In January 1968 another muddy flow was observed in the tailrace, 
although this time it was exiting from the rock floor, approximately 50 feet from the 
retaining wall (Simmons 1982). The source of this flow was found to be from a bedrock 
joint (USACE 2005). 
On March 13
th
, 1968 another sinkhole emerged (see Figure 5.1) near the 
downstream toe within the wraparound section of the embankment (Simmons 1982). This 
was an alarming development, as it enlarged to a maximum diameter of 13-feet and 10- 
feet deep, with a small portion that reached a depth of approximately 40-feet (USACE 
2005). On April 22, 1968 a third sinkhole opened about 42-feet from the March sinkhole, 









After the collapse of the first sinkhole in 1967 some exploratory borings were made 
and grouted piezometers installed. As the distress progressed throughout 1968 (see Figure 
5.2) the need for in-depth investigations became a top priority. The exploration and 
assessment efforts included: geologic studies, exploratory subsurface investigation, 
review of construction records, installation and evaluation of piezometers, water 
temperature surveys, geophysical surveys, reservoir profiling, tracer testing, and aerial 
photography among others. 
One of the first installed piezometers yielded free flowing water that rose to 
within two feet of the ground surface (Simmons 1982). The water temperature surveys 
showed a cool water zone that was traced around the end of masonry section, onward 
towards the sinkhole locations and into the tailrace (Simmons 1982). A profile of the 
reservoir was created with a Fathometer, and it showed at least six depressions near the 
upstream face of the dam (Simmons 1982). A test excavation to the top of rock near the 
downstream right toe exposed heavily jointed and karstified rock. Five joint orientations 
were recorded in the trench and solution channels that were approximately one foot wide 
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(Simmons 1982). A Thermonic study in 1971 proved unexpectedly useful when it 
identified the zones of major seepage, which happened to correlate with known solution 
features in the bedrock (Simmons 1982). However, even before the April 1968 sinkhole 
collapse, enough data was collected to indicate “…seepage was passing either under or 
through the cut-off trench or both, then down through a solution system in bedrock which 




Figure 5.2.  Illustration of distress indicators along the damsite.  
(modified from Fetzer 1979) 
(1) sinkhole of 8/22/67, (2) sinkhole of 3/13/1968, (3) sinkhole of 4/22/1968, (4) muddy 




5.3. EMERGENCY ACTION 
 It had become evident that remedial steps were necessary to mitigate the 
excessive seepage and sinkholes. The reservoir was lowered by 40 feet and an emergency 
grouting program was initiated in 1968 (USACE 2005). The two year program was 
intended only as a short-term solution to the apparent piping problem beneath the dam. 
The area of greatest concern was the wraparound section (see Figure 5.2), located at 
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Monolith 37 where the embankment ties into the concrete portion of the dam (Bradley, et 
al. 2007).  The sinkholes and other seepage indicators appeared here, and correlate with 
the orientation of the known karst features in the underlying core trench (USACE 1988).  
Thus the goal was to isolate the wraparound area with grout lines. This was accomplished 
by drilling two separate three-line grout curtains that ran perpendicular to each other 
(USACE 2005). The first was tied into Monolith 37 and installed along the crest of the 
dam; and the other was installed on the downstream side of the embankment, 150-feet 
from the concrete section (USACE 2005). Upon completion in June 1970 over 290,000 
cubic feet of grout solids had been pumped into the foundation (USACE 1988).   
The efficancy of the emergency grouting program was confirmed by a 
comparison of dye tracer test results. An initial test was undertaken by injecting 
fluroescein dye down holes which had been drilled into rock near the March 1968 
sinkhole. The results showed a maximum flow velocity between the sinkhole and the 
tailrace of 18 feet per minute (Simmons 1982). The same test was then performed after 
the emergency grouting, but this time no dye was observed in the tailrace (Simmons 
1982). The grouting program was, therefore widely accepted to have “saved the dam,” at 
least for the time being.  
In January 1972 an independent Board of Consultants; originally formed of 
Francis B. Slichter, Ralph B. Peck, and Frank A. Nickell; was tasked to with assessing 
the project and recommending a course of action to maintain the long-term integrity of 
the dam (USACE 1988).  By August of that year the Board found that: 
“…serious defects existed in the foundation, that grouting could not be 
considered an adequate permanent remedy for these defects, and that 
measures should be taken to insure the integrity of the foundation of the 
embankment …the most economical and reliable engineering solution was 
a concrete cutoff wall composed of pile-type elements along the upstream 
embankment crest. A similar cutoff wall was devised to protect the 






5.4. DIAPHRAGM WALL 
The US Army Corps of Engineers decided to bring in outside contractors for the 
design and construction of the concrete diaphragm wall, as it was a relatively new 
concept in the US during the 1970s (USACE 1988). The contract was split into Phases I 
and II, although both were awarded to ICOS Corporation of America (USACE 1988). 
The Phase I contract amount was $49,950,000 for the construction of a positive cutoff 
through the embankment section, and another positive cutoff between the tailrace and the 
switchyard (USACE 1988). Phase II was simply an extension of the Phase I wall; with 
the only major change being the addition of a retarder to the concrete mix (USACE 
1988). The project began when the official Notice to Proceed was signed on August 8th 
of 1975 (USACE 1988). 
5.4.1. Exploration and Grouting Program.  As previously discussed, the 
emergency grouting program of 1968-1970 had focused in the critical wraparound area of 
the dam (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). Later in 1970 it was determined that a 
“pre-installation exploration and grouting program” be continued along the embankment 
section. The five year endeavor consisted of drilling borings on 2.5 foot centers along the 
alignment of the proposed cutoff wall (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). The program 
served two purposes: first to analyze the embankment foundation for specific locations of 
solution activity, and second to grout the borings for added protection against seepage. 
Based on the findings of this exploration program it was determined that the original 
Board of Consultants’ recommendation of extending the main wall the full length of the 
embankment and to a depth of 5-feet below the Catheys-Leipers contact was excessive 
(USACE 2005). This resulted in shortening the length and of depth of the diaphragm 
wall, which will be discussed later. 
5.4.2. Specialized Equipment.  Since the design concept was unique for the 
time “…much of the equipment and materials used were of special order and of ICOS’ 
own design” (USACE 1988).  This included the Casagrande casing driver, Wolf Creek 
rigs, and so-called Hong Kong rigs. The Casagrande casing driver was a type of hydraulic 
jacking system that was utilized for the temporary casing installation and its subsequent 
removal (USACE 1988). The Wolf Creek rigs were mini cranes employed for the 
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excavation of the secondary elements (USACE 1988). The Hong Kong rigs were 
hydraulic drills that were adapted to the Wolf Creek project from a former ICOS job 
based in Hong Kong. They were used for drilling the large diameter holes (USACE 
1988). 
 
5.5. INSTALLATION PROCESS 
The ICOS diaphragm wall design was fundamentally a structure of 2.17-foot 
diameter steel cased primary elements on 4.5-foot centers, interlocked with concrete 
secondary elements for a minimum 2-foot wide wall (Fetzer 1979). The step-by-step 
installation process of these elements is outlined through the following figures and 
descriptions, taken from the US Army Corps of Engineers (1988; 2005): 
The first step to install the primary elements was to excavate a 53 inch diameter 
hole through the embankment to a depth of 72 to 80 feet using a toothed clamshell. Once 
open, the verticality was checked, and then filled with a thin bentonite slurry to the top of 
the excavation. Next, a 47-inch diameter, and 80-foot long temporary steel casing was 
inserted. These processes are illustrated below in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Overburden excavation and temporary casing installation. 
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Figure 5.4 shows the next step, in which the 47-inch casing was driven down 140-
feet using the Casagrande hydraulic casing driver, while a clamshell simultaneously 
excavated to the same depth. Verticality was again checked, using the direct plumb bob 
method. A 41.25-inch diameter temporary casing was then telescoped through the 47-




Figure 5.4.  Second temporary casing installation. 
 
 
In the third step (see Figure 5.5) a rotary drill was used to excavate a 36-inch 
diameter hole in the bedrock. During the rock drilling the verticality was checked every 
30-feet to verify the alignment remained within the 6-inch tolerance (Fetzer 1979). This 





Figure 5.5.   Rock excavation. 
 
 
Subsequently, a 36-inch exploratory core was drilled to a depth of up to 50-feet 
beyond the base elevation of the diaphragm wall. It was then pressure tested and grouted. 
Once the primary hole was cleaned of debris, the 26-inch diameter and 8-mm thick 
permanent casing was installed, and a final verticality check made. The annular space 
was grouted, and then the temporary casings were removed. The primary elements were 






Figure 5.6.  Core drilling and permanent casing installation. 
 
 
Once two primary elements were completed and the concrete set, the secondary 
elements were constructed between them. To do so the soil and annular space grout was 
first excavated from between two adjacent primary piles with the Wolf Creek Rig and a 
specially designed clamshell (Figure 5.7). The clamshell had small jaws and biconcave 





Figure 5.7.  Overburden excavation. 
 
Upon reaching the top of rock, a star chisel was used to break the rock, after 
which an expandable biconcave side chisel and bailer cleared out the cuttings. Following 
this the verticality was checked, and the hole was mucked clean of debris. Lastly, 
concrete was tremied into the secondary element excavation to complete the section. A 
typical plan and profile of a completed section of the diaphragm wall consisting of two 








5.6. UPDATED MONITORING SYSTEMS  
Constant monitoring during the progress of the cutoff wall installation was of high 
importance given the variability of the foundation rock. As a result, the monitoring 
instrumentation at Wolf Creek Dam became increasingly sophisticated during the 
construction of the diaphragm wall. By the time it was completed over 300 piezometers 
had been installed at various locations on and around the dam, as well as uplift cells, 
inclinometers, alignment plugs and surface monuments (USACE 2005). It should be 
noted that after the diaphragm wall was completed the number of monitored piezometers 
was decreased to around 100 (USACE 2005). The uplift pressure cells were “installed in 
the galleries of the concrete portion of the dam to monitor uplift pressures at the concrete 
rock interface” (USACE 2005). The inclinometers have been anchored into the bedrock 
along the downstream embankment and within the cutoff wall. The alignment plugs were 
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installed across the top of the masonry section prior to completion of the diaphragm wall; 
and later along the concrete cap covering the finished diaphragm wall. Finally, the 
surface monuments have been installed on the downstream side of the embankment 
(USACE 2005). 
 
5.7. DIAPHRAGM WALL COMPLETION 
The project was officially completed in 1979 with an extensive grout line, 
embankment wall, and switchyard wall; shown in Figure 5.9. Like most engineered 
structures, the original design of the diaphragm wall had to be tweaked and altered as 
deemed appropriate during the course of its installation. Most of these changes were 
intended to err on the side of caution. For instance, upon discovering materials indicative 
of solution activity, seven wall elements were constructed deeper than originally planned 
(USACE 1988). 
Over time two changes have proved problematic to the long-term success of the 
remediation. As noted earlier, the pre-installation exploration program justified the 
Corps’ decision that the diaphragm wall should only be extended over two-thirds of the 
embankment length, and that the depth needn’t exceed five feet into the Catheys 
(Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). Other than two highly solutioned areas (shown in 
Figure 5.10) the cutoff wall terminated within the Leipers formation, missing the 
karstified Catheys-Leipers contact. The justifications for these decisions were based on 
the idea that the emergency grouting and grouted exploration borings would seal off any 
small voids which were not intercepted by the diaphragm wall (Zoccola, Haskins and 






Figure 5.9.  Three dimensional model rendering of the dam and embankment.  
Grout curtain and switch yard cutoff walls (orange), diaphragm wall (dark green) and 






Figure 5.10.  Cross-sectional view of the diaphragm wall looking upstream. Note, the red 
line running down the center of the image divides construction Phase I (right) from Phase 




6. RECENT PROBLEMS 
 
6.1. POST-CONSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE 
6.1.1. Piezometer Implications.  One of the primary monitoring installations at 
Wolf Creek Dam is the series of piezometers encompassing the site. The data acquired 
from these suggests that seepage was only marginally reduced after the installation of the 
ICOS diaphragm wall. Over the course of time slightly less seepage occurred, but the 
piezometric pressures rose each year. This problem is captured in the following excerpt 
from the US Army Corps of Engineers (2005): 
While most of the piezometric levels have risen 3 to 4 feet since 1984, 2 
piezometers in the cone [wraparound] section reflect a 13-foot 
rise…Additionally, five (5) downstream piezometers read at their top of 
riser and either flow continually or during high pool events…In 1980 no 
piezometers were known to flow. 
The zones of elevated piezometric levels are highlighted in Figure 6.1 below. 
Note that the wraparound area has been outlined, as well as an area near the center of the 
ICOS diaphragm wall, and near the end of the ICOS wall.  
 
 
Figure 6.1.  Locations of elevated piezometer levels along the embankment after the 




 Speculations on the cause of continued seepage include: the shortened length of 
the wall, the shortened depth of the wall, hydro-fracturing of the embankment due to 
drilling and grouting or settlement, a lack of solid bond between the steel casing of the 
primary elements and the concrete secondary elements, poor contact between some of the 
secondary elements and the foundation rock, and honeycombed concrete within the wall 
elements. In regards to the latter two cases, it is interesting to note that in a 2004 
investigation of the diaphragm wall’s secondary elements, approximately 30% of these 
did not appear to have established a tight contact with the bedrock at their base, and 84% 
of them had segregated and/or honeycombed zones, (USACE 2005). Recall that void 
space (honeycombing) within the secondary elements may enable seepage, since those 
wall elements are not enclosed by a steel casing as the primary elements are. 
Any of these issues could promote seepage and hydraulic piping within and under 
the dam. It would seem likely that several of these mechanisms, if not all of them, have 
played a part in the problem. The 1970s diaphragm wall at Wolf Creek Dam proved 
unsuccessful at intercepting all of the solution features and flow paths necessary to 
prevent excessive seepage or to retard pore water pressures. 
6.1.2. More Reasons for Concern.  In the previous section it was noted that the 
piezometric data indicated seepage of Wolf Creek Dam has been increasing since the 
installation of the barrier wall in 1979. However, there have been other indicators of 
distress principally due to the large number of monitoring installations since the late 
1960s, as well as the supplemental investigations described hereafter. One of the most 
overt indications of renewed seepage was the reappearance of the wet areas near the 
downstream toe of the embankment section. By the 1990s these wet zones began 
increasing in size, and by 2004, they surpassed the extent which had been observed in the 
late 1960s (Zoccola, Haskins and Jackson 2008). In fact, the expanding nature of 
observed wet areas had a significant influence on recognizing the need of additional 
remediation. Another concern was the deflections noted from the inclinometers in the 
diaphragm wall (USACE 2005). Movement of the wall could have initiated cracking, 
which could create seepage pathways (USACE 2005). Distress was also seen in the form 
of embankment subsidence which was noted in 2004, near the wraparound section. This 
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was recorded by surface monuments at Station 37+00; as well as the observation of 
corresponding surface cracks on the highway on top of the embankment (USACE 2005). 
Engineers were not only concerned about the maximum embankment settlement of 0.296 
feet (since 1981), but also the increased rate of settlement since the mid-1990s (USACE 
2005).  
6.1.3. Cable Tunnel Investigation.  The power plant is connected to the 
switchyard by a cable tunnel, which houses the high voltage cables. The powerhouse is 
connected to the masonry dam, which settled with time. The cable tunnel developed 
seeping cracks by the 1980s, due to the differential settlement (USACE 2005). An 
investigation of these cracks was undertaken from 1999-2000 by the engineering firm 
Fuller, Mossbarger Scott and May (FMSM). 
In analyzing the available piezometric data, engineers were able to deduce that: 
“…the karst bedrock system still serves as an active drain for seepage through the dam,” 
and that there is a potential “…increase seepage through or under the switchyard 
diaphragm wall” (USACE 2005). The firm also determined that the total differential 
settlement was approximately 1 inch; with the understanding that there was no baseline 
data available for comparison (USACE 2005). The cause of settlement was given two 
possible explanations; either natural settlement over time, or settlement due to piping of 
the dam foundation (USACE 2005). Lastly, the FMSM determined the seepage observed 
exiting the cracks likely originated from the reservoir (USACE 2005).  
6.1.4. AMEC Investigations.  In late 2004 AMEC Earth and Environmental, 
Inc. was hired by the Corps of Engineers to investigate seepage conditions at Wolf Creek 
Dam. Their work included: installation of piezometers near the Fish Hatchery, falling 
head tests on selected piezometers, temperature surveys of all 145 active piezometers at 
the damsite, evaluation and trend analyses of historical data, evaluation of grout records 
and diaphragm wall installations, 3D steady state seepage analysis of the embankment, 
and lastly, a stability analysis of the area near the switchyard (USACE 2005).  The 3D 
analysis proved most valuable by enabling the visualization of multiple data layers 
pertaining to the damsite to be viewed together. In this manner correlations between the 
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different data sets could be made, which helped to establish likely seepage paths 
(Spencer, Greene and Haskins 2006). The results generated by these studies is can be 
summarized in the following statement from the US Army Corps of Engineers (2005): 
Within the switchyard area, wet areas and sinkholes appear to correlate 
with the large joint that passes below the end of the concrete portion of the 
dam. There is at least one PZ near the switchyard where the water 
temperature survey seems to indicate cold water, either from water passing 
beneath the dam or from tail water. Elevated PZ levels near the 
concrete/soil juncture appear to correlate with the location of a large 
bedrock joint excavated as part of the cut-off trench. There is some data to 
suggest that the diaphragm wall is not effectively controlling seepage in 
this area, but the seepage may also be routing around the westward end of 
the wall or below the concrete dam. Except for the switchyard and tail 
water areas, wet areas noted downstream of the dam and below the right 
abutment do not correlate within known bedrock weakness, and can be 
attributed to seepage through the earthen portion of the dam and through 
the right abutment.  
 
6.2. OFFICIAL ASSESSMENTS 
6.2.1. Panel of Consultants.  In August of 2004 an independent Panel of was 
formed by the Corps of Engineers, was formed to evaluate the Wolf Creek Dam seepage 
troubles (USACE 2005). This panel recommended that the Corps retain AMEC Earth and 
Environmental, Inc. to help with the seepage evaluations. After reviewing the evidence of 
ongoing seepage, the Panel agreed that a proactive approach in the form of a, major 
rehabilitation project was necessary. They recommended that a new diaphragm wall be 
installed that would extend the entire length of the embankment and overlap Monoliths 
31-37 on the upstream side, in conjunction with a triple line grout curtain upstream of 
Monoliths 28-30 (USACE 2005). The total project costs were estimated at the time to be 
$297 million. When analyzed on an annual basis the project costs came to $17.2 million 
per year, and the benefits to the country were estimated at $123 million per year; yielding 
a benefit-to-cost ratio of 7:1 (USACE 2005). 
6.2.2. DSAC Peer Review Panel.  The Dam Safety Action Classification 
(DSAC) Peer Review Panel was composed of independent experts in their respective 
fields. They visited the damsite in 2006 to assess its integrity and make recommendations 
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where needed (Bradley, et al. 2007). By December of that year the Panel prepared a final 
assessment stating that Wolf Creek Dam was, in fact, at a Class 1, “Urgent and 
Compelling” designation and that a piping failure mode was in an advanced Continuation 
Stage of development (Bradley, et al. 2007). This meant that the dam could not continue 
to operate at normal conditions without substantial risk of failure. Figure 6.2 outlines the 
process of a seepage failure through each developmental stage; note that the DSAC Peer 




Figure 6.2.  Seepage failure development stages. (from Bradley, et al. 2007) 
 
 
The DSAC Peer Review Panel outlined four potential modes of failure: 1) 
embankment failure through foundation seepage and piping, 2) embankment failure 
through instability, 3) concrete gravity failure through foundation seepage and piping, 
and 4) embankment failure through embankment seepage and piping (Bradley, et al. 
2007). The Panel found that the dam was “critically near failure” in regards to the first 
mode; specifically in the embankment foundation immediately adjacent to Monolith 37, 
and just beyond the end of the 1970s diaphragm wall (Bradley, et al. 2007). It should be 
noted that these two locations had been repeatedly identified by various studies and 
review boards as critical areas to the stability of the dam. 
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6.3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
At the time of the Peer Review Panel’s assessment in 2006-2007, they stated that 
a breach formation and loss of the reservoir would was likely to occur within the next 
five years (Bradley, et al. 2007). Therefore, emergency steps were necessary, as the 
proposed long term solution of a new barrier wall would take more than five years to 
complete. Similar to the late 1960s the first action was to lower the reservoir elevation 
incrementally from 723 to 680 feet (Roemhildt 2007). This decision was not made 
lightly, since the lowering of the pool would have severe hydropower, navigation, and 
economic repercussions on the local economy. In fact, the original recommendation by 
the DSAC Peer Review Panel was to drawdown the reservoir pool down to an elevation 
between 610 to 650 feet (Bradley, et al. 2007), which was later raised to the more feasible 
elevation. Furthermore, a grouting program began as soon as possible, specifically in the 
wraparound section and area to the right of the 1970s diaphragm wall termination point 
(Bradley, et al. 2007). Unlike the 1960s emergency grouting, the Panel specifically stated 
that “The grouting should be done using the most up-to-date techniques to fill voids that 
have developed…” (Bradley, et al. 2007). The Panel was making it clear that although 
the project was time sensitive the grouting program was critically important and must be 
done in the most thorough and effective means possible. The contract was awarded in 
September of 2006 to Advanced Construction Techniques, LTD for a total of $52 million 
(US Army Corps of Engineers, Nashville District 2007).  
 
6.4. PRE-CONSTRUCTION CONCERNS 
One of the biggest concerns in building a new diaphragm wall was repeating past 
mistakes. The DSAC Peer Review Panel expressed concern that even though the 
technology was much more advanced than that of the 1970s, there was still a possibility 
that a wall could not be constructed deep enough in the limestone to cut off the all the 
solution features (Bradley, et al. 2007). If this were the case, then seepage and piping 
would continue after completion of construction, just as it had in the 1980s. There was an 
additional concern that a reduction of pore water pressure within the dam and foundation 
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caused by the grouting and barrier wall construction might accelerate the development 
and collapse of solution features (Bradley, et al. 2007). Just as increased pore pressures 
can cause instability, a reduction of pore pressure can destabilize some the weaker 
structures.  
The Corps of Engineers have repeatedly been forced to make quick decisions in 
regards to the stability of Wolf Creek Dam and the safety of the surrounding area. Even 
though there were some concerns in building a new barrier wall in the embankment, it 
was deemed the best possible solution given the nature of the circumstances. 
 
6.5. RESULTS OF FAILURE 
If Wolf Creek Dam were to fail, the Cumberland River floodplain, containing 1.5 
million residents, would be effected (Roemhildt 2007). The cost of the structural and 
infrastructure damage alone was estimated to be $3.6 billion (Roemhildt 2007). The 
conservative Population at Risk was approximated at 770 people, with 56 to 237 of those 




7. TSJV BARRIER WALL 
 
7.1. DESIGN PLAN 
Due largely to the 1970s construction records, intensive 2004 analyses, and the 
2006-2007 Peer Review Panel assessments of Wolf Creek Dam, a surplus of once 
unknown information regarding embankment and foundation conditions was compiled 
and made available. With such a comprehensive geodatabase a remediation program 
could be developed that would hopefully curtail future seepage problems, once and for 
all. In 2007 this new plan was estimated to cost $584 million (Santillan and Salas 2012). 
Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture (TSJV) was awarded the $341.4 million contract in 
July of 2008 for the main rehabilitation work (USACE 2008). 
The heart of this program was a new 980,000 ft2 barrier wall that would 
encompass the length of the embankment, beginning immediately upstream of the 
rightmost concrete monoliths (Santillan and Salas 2012). The majority of the new wall 
was to be built to a depth of 277-feet, up to 75-feet deeper than most of the1970s cutoff 
wall (Santillan and Salas 2012). A concise statement of the new wall requirements is 
given in the Forward of the Working Procedures for the Pile Barrier Wall, and reads as 
follows: 
The Barrier Wall to be installed for the rehabilitation in Wolf Creek Dam 
must form a continuous concrete barrier a minimum of 24-in thick, and 
must extend from Station 72+00 to 34+05.61 (RFI-0107), where it is to be 
connected to the concrete section of the dam. The Wall will be installed 
upstream of the dam center line, from a working platform at 
approximately El. 748.2 feet. The piles are 50 inches in diameter (54 
inches in diameter for the top pre-excavated sections)…Since May 18th, 
2011, all secondary piles have been extended, thus forming a “sawtooth” 
arrangement at the base of the BW. (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 
2011) 
 
7.1.1. Specialized Equipment.  Foundation conditions at the Wolf Creek 
damsite are complex and dynamic. One of the most vexing issues was the high variability 
of rock strength that would be encountered in the foundation. The limestone units range 
42 
 
in strength from 9,000 to 35,000 psi; and the shale units range from 2,000 to 11,000 psi 
(Lopez and Haskins 2011). As in the 1970s, it was necessary to employ specialized 
equipment to install the barrier wall.   
The Hydromill, model type Hydrofraise EVO 3/5, was utilized for the initial deep 
excavation of PCEW (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). "The Hydromill, a 
continuous reverse circulation soil/rock cutter, cuts a vertical panel of the proposed width 
of the wall in one full-depth pass while disposing of  the excavated materials via a 
hydraulic, reverse mud circulation system” (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). 
One if the key features of this machinery is that the operator can vary the rotation of 
individual cutters, as well as tilt them forward and backward (Bomar 2010). This 
advanced steering allows quick and efficient correction of deviation from the planned 
geometry. Figure 7.1 below shows a schematic representation of how the Hydromill 
works. A noticeable technological advancement seen on the Hydromill are the 
transducers connected to real time recording units that take measurements such as: cutter 
depth, inclination, twist of the panel, as well as torque and rotational speed of the wheels 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). 
 
 
Figure 7.1.  Schematic drawing of the RCD Hydromill. 




 The WIRTH PBA-818 drill rig is another notable piece of excavation equipment; 
this one being utilized for the main Barrier Wall of the embankment. It is a massive piece 
of machinery that has a Bottom Hole Assembly of approximately 70 metric tonnes 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). The purpose of the rig was to excavate the 
secant piles. To do so, the WIRTH was fitted with a stinger that would strictly follow the 
DD holes to depth, essentially guaranteeing a lack of deviation of the piles (Santillan and 
Salas 2012).  On-board instrumentation on the WIRTH recorded the depth, torque, 
weight on bit, rotation speed, and air pressure, against time (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint 
Venture 2011) 
7.1.2. Monitoring Systems.  One of the most unique features of the TSJV 
barrier wall installation was the attention to verticality and tolerance ranges. Advanced 
technology was utilized as a means of quality control for this aspect of the project; 
specifically, the KODEN and PARATRACK II survey devices. The KODEN (series 
DM-602/604) is a “Drilling Monitoring” (Koden Electronics Co., Ltd. 2009) system that 
utilizes ultrasonic echo sensors. It consists of a probe with four ultrasonic emitters and 
four sensors that measure the distance of the emitters from the excavation wall 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). It is lowered down the length of the opening 
with a winch, and essentially maps the excavation from top to bottom. The 
PARATRACK II probe is composed of tri-axial accelerometers and magnetometers, 
temperature sensors, and digitizing circuitry (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). 
It is inserted through the rod stems of the drill rig and then reads the magnetic azimuth 
and inclination of the last rod drilled (Lopez and Haskins 2011). An example of the 
PARATRACK II data analysis is given in Figure 7.2. 
Although the inclinometer is not necessarily and new monitoring tool, it has been 
substantially advanced over the years. This is most notable on the Hydromills which have 
three fixed inclinometers on their frames that yield real-time positioning information 
throughout excavation (Bomar 2010). The resultant data can be used to create 
representations of the PCEW, like the one shown in Figure 7.3, in reference to the 




Figure 7.2.  Example pilot hole verticality plots (Polar Plot and Axis Plot).  
Shows a comparative analysis of the Inclinometer readings versus the PARATRACK 




Figure 7.3.  Example visualization of the Hydromill Panel excavation.  
Allowed Tolerance (red), Theoretical location (green), and Actual location (blue)  
(from Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010) 
 
 
Optical televiewers were also employed in the grouting process beneath and 
within the embankment. They were sent into the boreholes to assess the geology and rock 
conditions at depth (Bomar 2010). An example borehole image is shown in Figure 7.4; 
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note that the four adjacent images represent an “unfolded” view of one location within 
the hole (Bomar 2010). 
 
 
Figure 7.4.  Example output from an optical televiewer at Wolf Creek Dam. 
(from Bomar 2010) 
 
 
7.1.3. Method Testing.  Prior to any construction TSJV tested all of the 
techniques to be used for the barrier wall installation in the controlled environment of two 
“technique areas” (Santillan and Salas 2012). The purpose of these tests was to evaluate 
any foreseeable problems and correct them, to establish confidence in the planned 
construction methods. 
 
7.2. PREPARATORY PHASE 
The preparatory phase was the initial component in the installation sequence for 
the new barrier wall. The purpose of which was to minimize the risk of further damaging 
the embankment and/or foundation during construction (Santillan and Salas 2012). The 
preparatory phase was broken down into four individual stages: 1) high mobility grouting 
program, 2) low mobility grouting program, 3) installation of the Protective Concrete 
Embankment Wall, and 4) installation of Directionally-Drilled pilot holes.  
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7.2.1. Grouting.  Two grout lines were installed on either side of the planned 
barrier wall location to temporarily block seepage and prevent slurry loss when 
construction of the wall began (Bomar 2010). The first two stages of the preparatory 
phase were grouting programs along the embankment. Stage one was a drilling and high 
mobility grouting (HMG) program that was utilized to treat the rock to a minimum depth 
of five feet below top of rock (Santillan and Salas 2012). The second step involved a low 
mobility grout (LMG) treatment of the embankment and top of rock interface, as well as 
near the top of the foundation drilling and grouting work (Santillan and Salas 2012). 
7.2.2. PCEW Installation.  The third step of the preparatory phase was the 
installation of the Protective Concrete Embankment Wall (PCEW). This was a 6-feet 
wide, 9-feet long, and keyed a minimum of 2-feet below the top of rock (Lopez and 
Haskins 2011). Due to the high strength indices of the foundation bedrock it was feared 
that the excavation process alone could be very time consuming, leaving the embankment 
exposed for long periods of time during construction (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 
2010). The concept of the PCEW was developed to protect the embankment during the 
installation of the main Barrier Wall. The PCEW would also serve to stop any loss of 
slurry, that was deemed a likely possibility near the rock-embankment interface 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010).  
The PCEW was installed through the excavation of a single bite Primary and 
Secondary panel sequence (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). Each Secondary 
panel overlaps two Primary panels on either end by a minimum of 1 to 5 inches 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). The Hydromill was used to socket the wall 
into the rock. Its verticality is simultaneously monitored by inclinometers, and the 
tolerance of the PCEW excavation was later measured by the KODEN (Lopez and 
Haskins 2011). The top of rock was cleaned out with a hammer grab and chisel; followed 
by concreting with 10-inch diameter tremie pipes (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 
2010). The concrete mix ws specified to exhibit a 28 day strength more than 2,000 psi, 
and a 90 day strength in excess of 4,000 psi (Lopez and Haskins 2011). Figures 7.5 and 





Figure 7.5.  Steps 1-3 of the PCEW construction sequence.  





Figure 7.6.  Steps 4 and 5 of the PECEW construction sequence. 
(from Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010) 
 
 
7.2.3. Pilot Holes.  The fourth and final step was the installation of directionally 
drilled (DD) pilot holes. These pilot holes serve to investigate the conditions below the 
top of rock, as well as guide the secant piles during the construction phase of the project. 
They were drilled through the PCEW and into the foundation bedrock to a maximum 
depth of 282 feet (Santillan and Salas 2012). Each DD hole was eight inches in diameter, 
on 31.5-inch spacing for Non-Critical Areas, and 35-inch spacing for Critical Areas 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). They were drilled to the target depths with a 
SOILMEC PSM 16GT drill rig, and WASSARA W150 water powered hammer 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). Once completed, the hole was backfilled with 
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a temporary (soft) grout to avoid cuttings and other debris from contaminating the panel 
pour (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). 
The DD pilot holes are imperative because they enable the drillers to reach the 
target destination with a minimum deviation. As the DD hole is drilled the deviation is 
checked every 10 feet with the PARATRACK II and inclinometer monitoring (Lopez and 
Haskins 2011). In fact, the project began with a maximum allowable deviation of 8.5 
inches at the maximum 282-foot depth, but ended up achieving two to three inches of 
deviation for the majority of the elements (Santillan and Salas 2012). 
 
7.3. CONSTRUCTION PHASE 
After the DD pilot holes were successfully drilled through the PCEW on their 
designated centers, construction of the main Barrier Wall could begin. This was 
accomplished using the Pile Barrier Wall (PBW) and the Combined Barrier Wall (CBW) 
method. The original plan only required the PBW to be utilized in the four Critical Areas 
of the embankment, making the CBW the chosen method for the majority of the barrier 
wall. However, there was some debate throughout the course of the project as to the final 
ratio of PBW to CBW methods used. 
7.3.1. Pile Barrier Wall.  For the PBW method 50-inch diameter secant piles 
were excavated with the WIRTH pile rig and then backfilled with concrete (Treviicos-
Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). This process began by pre-drilling excavation of 60 
to135 feet from the surface using either a bucket auger or rock auger (Treviicos-
Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). The purpose of the initial excavation was to 
accommodate the large Bottom Hole Assembly of the WIRTH (Treviicos-Soletanche 
Joint Venture 2011).The pile bore verticality was verified using the KODEN and 
PARATRACK II probes. The WIRTH was then aligned with a pilot hole and bolted in 
place. The pile was then drilled to the target depth, typically 274-feet, using a Reverse 
Circulation Drilling method to limit any disturbance to the surrounding materials 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). After the bottom hole cleaning was 
completed the concrete was tremied into the excavation.  
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The described process was completed for both Primaries and the Secondary 
elements of each section. Once the concrete was cast in the first element, was required to 
cure until an unconfined compressive strength of 1,000 psi was achieved, before any 
element within 40 feet of it can be excavated (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2011). 
Therefore, the two Primaries were installed first, followed by the excavation and 
installation of the Secondary pile between them, as shown in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 below. 
It should be noted that the Plan View establishes that the Barrier Wall thickness is no less 
than 35-inches; thereby achieving the required minimum 24-inch ubiquitous thickness for 
the entire length of the cutoff wall.  
 
 
Figure 7.7.  Plan view of the Secant Pile Wall construction phases. 





Figure 7.8.  Profile of the Secant Pile Wall construction phases. Step 1 is a lateral view 
and Steps 2-4 are front views.  




7.3.2. Combined Barrier Wall.  The Combined Barrier Wall (CBW) method 
was intended to be constructed in the Non-Critical Areas of the embankment, which 
extend to a shallower depth than the four defined Critical Areas. This method is 
essentially a combination of the PBW and PCEW techniques that have been previously 
described. Thus the CBW utilized both the Hydromill and the WIRTH for the excavation 
processes. However, the spacing of the piles and the dimensions of the Middle Panel will 
differed from the previous methods.  
The pile elements were be excavated and installed according to the procedures 
outlined in the Pile Barrier Wall section. The Primary piles were spaced 126-inches apart, 
with a Middle Panel centered between them (Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). 
The piles will primarily “…serve as interconnecting elements between panel elements to 
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avoid having to achieve an edge overlap connection between panels within the rock” 
(Treviicos-Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). The area between the two Primary Piles was 
excavated with the Hydromill in a manner that centers the Middle Panel on the Middle 
Pile. The Middle Panels were constructed with dimensions of 2-feet 7-inches in width, by 
9-feet 2-inches in length; with a general target elevation of 475 feet (Treviicos-
Soletanche Joint Venture 2010). A plan view of this sequence is shown in Figure 7.9. It 
should be noted that later in the progression of the Barrier Wall project TSJV found that 




Figure 7.9.  Plan view of the CBW construction sequence.  




7.4. WALL COMPLETION 
During installation of the barrier wall project TSJV anticipated a completion date 
of December 2013, with a goal of raising the reservoir pool back to normal levels (720 
feet) by the summer of 2014. By January of 2013 it was realized that the project was on 
track for completion in the spring of that year. TSJV completed the Barrier Wall at Wolf 
Creek Dam on March 6th, 2013 when they poured the concrete for the 1,197
th
 and final 
pile (Treviicos 2013). A completion ceremony was held on April 19
th
, 2013.  
The chart below (Figure 7.10) shows the general rate of completion between the 
start of actual installation work in April of 2009 to the close of the wall in March of 2013. 
The percentages shown were acquired through the “Project Updates” which the Corps’ 
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Nashville District posted on their website during the project. For this reason data points 
were only available on a sporadic basis. Never the less some insightful conclusions can 
be drawn from this information. The first observable fact is that construction appeared to 
move at a fairly linear rate. The one noticeable area of a slowed progress occurred from 
August to November of 2010. This is likely attributable to the difficulties that were 
encountered at Critical Area 1. This is the wraparound area of the embankment, where so 
many problems had developed in the past. Known karst voids existed in the area. TSJV 
was concerned that construction in the area would promote instability, and decided to halt 
production there from March to November of 2010 while the best method of treating the 
area was determined.  
 
 
Figure 7.10.  Percentage of Barrier Wall completed over the project lifespan. 
 
 
Although the wall is technically finished there is still work to be done at the 
damsite. The next major priority is to raise the pool level incrementally, ideally reaching 
700-705 feet by the summer of 2013, followed by normal pool elevation in the fall of 
2013 (Treviicos 2013). In the meantime riprap needs to be laid on the upstream side of 
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54 
 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.3. COMPARISONS 
8.1.1. Distress Indicators.  Table 8.1 below outlines the major distress 
indicators that were identified between the times of the initial dam completion in 1952 
until the time of the ICOS diaphragm wall completion in 1979; compared to those from 
the time after the wall installation to the beginning of the TSJV barrier wall construction 
in 2009. The table addresses only those indicators which could be measured in some 
manner during both of those time intervals. Therefore methods of assessment such as 
specific geophysical studies, inclinometer data, and crack pin analysis are not taken into 
consideration here. 
Table 8.1 justifies two facts that have been presented in this research: 1) there are 
many forms by which seepage and piping present themselves, both on the surface and 
within the dam, and 2) the seepage pathways have changed over time. The cause of 
change in flow paths under, through and around the embankment is a debatable issue. 
The most likely cause is the dynamic karstic environment of the foundation. Conduits are 
constantly changing; widening, caving in, and branching off in new directions. This does 
not have to be on a large or even perceptible scale for it to drastically affect the 
subsurface flow network.  
The second likely cause of flow change is due to the introduction of the different 
seepage barriers. The numerous grout lines and the two cutoff walls have undoubtedly 
changed the local flow regime, which was their intended purpose. In fact, a new 
argument is that in many cases, involving limestone, seepage barriers may actually 
worsen the seepage problems. Rice and Duncan (2007) examined this topic, and clearly 
explain their findings in the following statement: 
Due primarily to the buildup of hydraulic pressure and increased hydraulic 
gradients that are caused by seepage barriers, dams with seepage barriers 
are subject to a unique set of mechanisms that may combine to form 
potential failure modes that would be infeasible or less feasible in dams 
without a seepage barrier. 
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Table 8.1.  Comparison of distress indicators observed before and after the first cutoff 
wall installation. 
Indicator 1952 - 1979 1980 – 2009 
Wet Areas 
 A total of 8 areas were noted 
from 1962-1968 
 
 A total of 37 areas noted from 
1980-2004 
Muddy Flows 
 October, 1967 





 August, 1967 (near D/S right 
toe) 
 March, 1968 (near switchyard) 
 April, 1968 (near switchyard) 
 






 5 recorded between 1989-2005 
Cold Water in 
PZs 
 Cold zones noted near 
wraparound area and tailrace 
during 1968 investigations 
 
 6 cold zones noted in 2004 
temperature survey 
Settlement None 
 Cable Tunnel cracks noted in 
1987 
 0.15 feet of settlement from 
1981-1997 at Station 37+00 
 0.15 feet of settlement from 
1997-2004 at Station 37+00 
 Gap noticed between U/S 
portion of joint between 
Monolith 37and 36 in 2006  
 Compression  noticed between 
D/S portion of joint between 




8.1.2. Assessment Methods.  Before the 1960s the only form of performance 
monitoring of the dam was through visual assessments of the embankment, and 
recordation of seepage flows through weir discharge, and the tailrace. When collapse 
features occurred in 1967-68, the Corps began installing piezometers which they 
increasingly relied upon. In fact, piezometers still outnumber all other monitoring devices 
installed at Wolf Creek Dam. Historically, the Casagrande type and wellpoint type have 
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been favored over other piezometers designs, due to their low cost and reliability 
(Simmons 1982).  
During the late 1960s and early 1970s new technologies emerged, which allowed 
increased levels of monitoring assessment of underseepage. These devices were still 
limited by their isolated locations and were subject to considerable inference and 
interpretation. In an effort to “fill in the blanks,” several surveys were conducted, 
including: water temperature surveys, piezometric surveys, dye tracer tests, saline tracer 
tests, electrical resistivity surveys of the embankment, fathometer surves of the reservoir, 
remote sensing imagery, and thermonic surveys (Simmons 1982). However, only the 
temperature surveys, dye traces, fathometer profile, and thermonic survey provided any 
previously unknown information. Even with these successful investigations, it was the 
piezometers that were utilized most frequently, as they were the most accessible and 
pervasive monitoring system on site, and continue collecting data over long periods of 
time. 
During the investigations that lead up to the most recent remediation at Wolf 
Creek Dam, GIS software and a 3D modeling program known as MVS/EVS, were 
utilized to develop a spatial dataset summary ongoing monitoring the damsite. The 
program enables multiple data sets, such as piezometers levels, reservoir elevation, 
surface topography, grout takes, and other metrics to be viewed in three dimensions 
(Spencer, Greene and Haskins 2006). This puts all the known information in one easily 
accessible and understandable format for trends and discrepancies to be more easily 
identified over the entire area. 
8.1.3. Remediation Types.  Some of the major features of the cutoff walls have 
been listed in Table 8.2 as a means of quick comparison between the two projects. For 
convenience when analyzing the table each project is referred to by the contractor names, 
ICOS and TSJV. Both projects took nearly the same amount of time to complete, with the 
TSJV wall exceeding the ICOS wall by about a year. The ICOS wall was smaller than the 
TSJV wall, but it did encompass the switchyard area. The near equal depths of the two 
projects may be surprising, but it should be remembered that most of the ICOS wall was 
taken to a much shallower depth than its maximum point. Both walls required customized 
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excavation equipment to suit the specialized needs of the damsite’s unique geology and 
design requirements. The efficiency and accuracy of the TSJV equipment exceeded that 
of the ICOS equipment due to the progression of technological advancements in the 
industry over the three de4cade interim between the projects. This includes the verticality 
and deviation methods that were much advanced during the TSJV construction. The 
KODEN and PARATRACK II weren’t available at the time of the first wall installation. 
One of the biggest differences between the two projects can be appreciated in the 
“Wall Type” category. The ICOS wall consisted of one sequence throughout the length of 
the project in which primary piles were excavated and backfilled with the secondary 
element between them. It can be described as a cross between the Pile Barrier Wall and 
Combination Barrier Wall of the TSJV project. One of the biggest problems in this 
system was the number of steel-on-concrete joints. TSJV mitigated this issue by creating 
cold joints between all elements. As is shown in the table, TSJV also utilized three types 
of wall sequences; the PCEW, PBW, and CBW. The PCEW was essentially a wall for the 
barrier wall; it ensured excessive slurry loss would not occur during the main barrier wall 
installation. The PBW and CBW were created with the understanding that the damsite 
foundation is not ubiquitous, and therefore the wall must be adjusted for the changing 
foundation conditions exposed along its length.  
There is nearly a $500 million difference in cost between the ICOS and TSJV 
cutoff wall projects. This is an example of how looking at the bottom line does not tell 
you everything you need to know. Specifically, that the cost of the second wall was only 
necessary because the less expensive original wall did not perform as intended. It is the 
belief that all of the extra precautions that have been taken for the installation of the 
TSJV barrier wall will hopefully ensure that additional cutoff walls never again have to 




Table 8.2.  Comparison of major definitive characteristics of the 1970s ICOS Diaphragm 
Wall and the 2000s TSJV Barrier Wall. 
Characteristic ICOS Diaphragm Wall TSJV Barrier Wall 
Timeframe  1975 - 1979  2008-2013 
Size/Location  Switchyard 
 2/3 of the embankment 
(531,000 square feet) 
 Entire embankment length 
(980,000 square feet) 
Maximum 
Depth 
 280 feet 
 




 Casagrande Casing Driver 
 Wolf Creek Rigs 






 Direct Plumb Bob Method 
 Inclinometer 
 Inclinometer 
 PARATRACK II 
 KODEN 
 
Wall Type  Pile Wall  Protective Concrete 
Embankment Wall 
 Pile Barrier Wall 
 Combined Barrier Wall 
Cost  Approximately $96 million   Approximately $594 million 
 
 
8.1.4. Quality Control.  The work platform at Wolf Creek Dam was a very busy 
place from 2007-13. There were dozens of cranes, drill rigs, vehicles, and all people. 
Upon closer inspection there appeared to be at least as many members of the Corps 
District on the platform as there were workers for the TSJV and their subcontractors. The 
reason for this is the exceptionally strict quality control standards that were developed by 
the TSJV and the Corps. It enabled the contractors to control essentially every detail of 
thesensitive construction sequence; in point of fact over 350 quality control tasks are 
performed on a daily basis (Santillan and Salas 2012). When reading through the element 
installation working procedures it quickly becomes apparent that there was a quality 
control step required for almost, if not every, activity completed. Often times a QC team 
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member had to remain on site during the action in order sign off on its precision. An 
example of one of the many quality control check lists that must be filled out on-site 
during construction processes is shown in Figure 8.1. 
 
 




To some this may seem unnecessarily time consuming and labor intensive. 
However, TSJV proved otherwise by completing the Barrier Wall almost six months 
ahead of schedule. More importantly, the job could in no way be rushed in such a manner 
that would result in a need for future remediation due to the precise quality control 
standards. Table 8-3 lists some examples as to how the TSJV exceeded the performance 
requirements of the barrier wall, all as a direct result of their QC practices. When the 
construction techniques are held to the highest standards, the project moves along more 
smoothly, project costs are reduced, and the likelihood of future problems is ameliorated.  
 
Table 8.3.  Exceedance of barrier wall performance requirements. 





When considering the results shown in Table 8-3 of the TSJV barrier wall, it is 
difficult to attempt any meaningful comparison with the 1970s diaphragm wall. In fact, 
the first wall represented the technology and standards of the time, just as the initial 
construction flaws of the dam were a product of 1940s standards. However, some fault 
does lie in the disregard of the wall length and depth recommended by the 1970s Board 
of Consultants. One of the consultants, Professor Ralph Peck, told the Corps they 
“…could install the wall the full length of the embankment now or they would have to do 
it later” (USACE 2005). 
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8.2. NEW STATE-OF-PRACTICE 
8.2.1. Complications of Karst Foundations.  Carbonate rock is always a risky 
foundation to build on. Yet, in many cases the effects of subsurface solution activity 
seldom adversely affect the structures. When building hydraulic structures however, the 
likelihood of future problems becomes much greater. While reviewing the literature 
standards for building on karst foundations the concept of “designing for the geology” is 
the key. Unfortunately, regardless of the number of borings drilled, geophysical surveys 
made, or hydraulic studies assessed, there is no way to completely understand the 
subsurface conditions in a heavily karstified foundation. Consequently, the only 
reasonable way to design dams is by employing redundant protective measures. This 
requires judicious use of the “Observation Method” (Dunnicliff and Deere 1984), which 
allows geologists and engineers to actively explore and amend the design assumptions 
during construction. This flexibility cannot be accommodated using fixed-price contracts 
typical of state and federal agencies, whose projects are normally funded through annual 
appropriations. A realistic benefit-to-cost ratio must be determined before proceeding 
with a project that justifies the flexibility so crucial to sites with unknown foundation 
conditions. In the case of Wolf Creek Dam, the benefit-to-cost ratio was 7:1, making the 
decision to construct such a robust structure the clear alternative (USACE 2005).  
8.2.2. Dam Sites with Similar Geology.  In 2005 and 2006 the US Army Corps 
of Engineers began a screening process of the Corps’ highest risk dams to determine 
which required priority over all others. The following dams were identified as being 
critically near failure or have extremely high life and/or economic risk: 1) Wolf Creek 
Dam in Kentucky, 2) Center Hill Dam in Tennessee, 3) Martis Creek Dam in California , 
4) Isabella Dam in California, 5) Clearwater Dam in Missouri, 6) Herbert Hoover Dike in 
Florida (USACE 2007). Of those six dams four of them are afflicted by carbonate 
foundations that have perpetuated seepage and piping; Wolf Creek Dam, Center Hill 
Dam, Clearwater Dam, and Herbert Hoover Dike. Of those four, both Wolf Creek and 




Many of these remediation projects have either been started or already completed. 
Clearwater Dam experienced problems very similar to Wolf Creek Dam that it was like. 
Like Wolf Creek it was begun in the early 1940s as an earth embankment dam on a 
karstic foundation, and construction was suspended during World War II. In 2006 the 
Clearwater Major Rehabilitation project began (Knight, et al. 2010). It consisted of an 
extensive grouting program and installation of a concrete panel cutoff wall, which was 
completed in December 2011. Although this project occurred before and during the Wolf 
Creek project, many similarities in the excavation techniques and equipment were 
employed at both sites. It is likely that the successful project at Wolf Creek will influence 
other foundation remediation projects, including those referenced above.  
In hindsight, if all of the six dams had seepage barriers constructed like that of the 
newest diaphragm wall at Wolf Creek, they would not likely have experienced such 
noticeable problems with underseepage. The Wolf Creek Dam Major Rehabilitation 
Project will likely have a global influence on the state of practice for foundation 
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